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Abstract This article provides a historical contextual-
ization of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its
political role. CSR, we propose, is one form of business–
society interactions reflecting a unique ideological framing.
To make that argument, we compare contemporary CSR
with two historical ideal-types. We explore in turn pater-
nalism in nineteenth century Europe and managerial
trusteeship in early twentieth century US. We outline how
the political responsibilities of business were constructed,
negotiated, and practiced in both cases. This historical
contextualization shows that the frontier between economy
and polity has always been blurry and shifting and that
firms have played a political role for a very long time. It
also allows us to show how the nature, extent, and impact
of that political role changed through history and co-
evolved in particular with shifts in dominant ideologies.
Globalization, in that context, is not the driver of the
political role of the firm but a moderating phenomenon
contributing significantly to the dynamics of this shift. The
comparison between paternalism, trusteeship, and con-
temporary CSR points to what can be seen as functional
equivalents—alternative patterns of business–society
interactions that each correspond, historically, to unique
and distinct ideological frames. We conclude by drawing
implications for future theorizing on (political) CSR and
stakeholder democracy.
Keywords Political CSR  Neoliberalism  Paternalism 
Trusteeship  Globalization  Stakeholder democracy
Introduction
The debate on where the responsibility of business ends
and that of government starts is an old one. We can at least
trace it back to the 18th century opposition between Mer-
cantilism and Liberalism (Screpanti and Zamagni 2005). In
its contemporary version, this debate has been shaped by
Milton Friedman’s provocative claim that the only
responsibility of the corporate executive is to his employ-
ers—the shareholders (Friedman 1970). This proposition
suggests an axiomatic and even natural separation between
business and state responsibilities. Arguably, it remains to
this day a structuring ‘‘null hypothesis’’—from, against or
in relation to which most contemporary discussions on
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) inscribe themselves
(Kinderman 2012; Marens 2008).
This ‘‘null hypothesis,’’ however, is not neutral in any
way but ideologically framed. Friedman’s (1970) article
revealed, expressed, and formalized a specific and conse-
quential ideological frame. Ideological frames are the
cognitive and value lenses that constitute our mental maps,
the background worldviews through which individual and
collective actors approach, read, and act upon the world
(Cheal 1979; Davies and McGoey 2012; Padelford and
White 2009; Schmid 1981). With respect to the interplay
between business and government, this specific ideological
frame put forward by Friedman had five main dimen-
sions—individual wealth maximization is the source of
collective welfare; corporations belong to (and should
serve) their owners—shareholders; business and politics
have different logics; that should be kept as separate as
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possible; and the political sphere should have only a sup-
portive and minimal role. The principled separation of
business and state responsibilities hence cannot be appre-
hended without reference to the framing role of a powerful
background worldview or ideology (Davies and McGoey
2012; Padelford and White 2009; Van Dijk 1998). We will
refer to that specific ideological frame, as ‘‘shareholder
value maximization.’’ It is often discussed, in the literature,
under the broader label of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ (e.g., Djelic
2006; Harvey 2005; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009).
Within the corpus of CSR research, the ‘‘instrumental
CSR’’ paradigm has long been dominant (Garriga and Mele´
2004; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Vogel 2005). This para-
digm clearly inscribed itself in continuity with the ideo-
logical frame expressed by Friedman’s ‘‘null hypothesis’’—
CSR being legitimate only if it contributed to the maxi-
mization of profits and value for shareholders (Mackey et al.
2007; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). In contrast, the recent
political turn in CSR research has come to question and
critique this separation and some of the ideological
assumptions it reveals (Matten and Crane 2005a; Scherer
and Palazzo 2007, 2011; Scherer et al. 2009). A key argu-
ment in this stream of research is that, in the context of
globalization, the boundaries between economic and polit-
ical spheres are getting increasingly blurred. Globalization
entails the weakening role and power of nation states and
fosters in parallel a ‘‘new political role’’ for private business
(Scherer and Palazzo 2011). As corporations increase in
size and operate in multiple countries, they come to ‘‘as-
sume enlarged responsibilities in their globally expanded
business environments—responsibilities once regarded as
genuine governmental responsibilities’’ (Scherer and
Palazzo 2007, p. 1109, emphasis authors). With political
CSR, we share the project of moving CSR scholarship
beyond the economic and instrumental perspective (Scherer
and Palazzo 2011, p. 904). We also agree that globalization
changes the nature of the interplay between business and
politics. We argue, however, that political responsibilities
have not always been in any absolute or natural sense
‘‘genuine governmental responsibilities’’.
Current theorizing on CSR in general and political CSR
in particular is largely a-historical. Most studies tracing the
origins of CSR go back at most to the 1950s and the work
of Howard R. Bowen (Acquier et al. 2011; Carroll 2008,
for an exception see Marens 2012, 2013). The focus is
mostly on the structuration of a CSR preoccupation and
field in the period since the late 1970s—in parallel to the
deployment of neoliberal globalization (e.g., Kaplan 2015;
Kinderman 2012). This limits, we propose, our capacity to
compare and contrast CSR as a particular form of busi-
ness–society interactions inscribed in a singular worldview
with alternatives that would be set in different ideological
grounds (Matten and Moon 2008).
This is, precisely, the step we propose to take in this
article. To move beyond the economic and instrumental
perspective on CSR, we contextualize CSR historically as
one form of business–society interactions that reflects a
unique ideological framing. The comparison of CSR with
alternative patterns of business–society interactions in
history and their associated background ideologies allows
for a critique of the ‘‘null hypothesis’’ that is more radical,
we suggest, than that of political CSR. This historical
contextualization shows that the frontier between economy
and polity has always been blurry and shifting and that
firms have played for a very long time a political role. It
also allows us to show how the nature, extent, and impact
of that political role changed through history and co-
evolved with shifts in dominant ideologies.
We explore this empirically through a historical analysis
of the political role of firms in two distinct periods—in the
context of nineteenth century paternalism in Europe and in
the context of corporate/managerial trusteeship in the
1920s in the United States. We outline how the political
responsibilities of business were constructed, negotiated,
and practiced in both cases. The comparison between
paternalism, trusteeship, and current notions of CSR points
to what can be seen as functional equivalents—alternative
patterns of business–society interactions that each corre-
spond, historically, to unique ideological frames. While
contemporary CSR corresponds to a ‘‘shareholder value
maximization’’ ideology, we connect paternalism to an
ideological frame that we label ‘‘authoritarian-owner
benevolence’’ and trusteeship to an ideology that we
characterize as ‘‘techno-managerial efficiency.’’ The his-
torical cases, furthermore, point to a number of past
shortcomings, such as managerial discretion, infantilizing
forms of control, or the privatization of politics, which help
us make sense, through a mirror effect, of some of the
limits of contemporary CSR.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We
start with a short review of the debates around political
CSR. We then discuss our methods—a comparison of two
historical ideal-types. In the following two sections, we
present in turn the two historical ideal-types that constitute
the empirical base for this article. In the discussion section,
we contextualize contemporary CSR through a systematic
comparison with those historical cases and explore the
moderating role played in recent years by neoliberal
globalization. Using systematic ideal-type comparison as a
conceptualizing device (Glaser 2002), we are able to
identify four main dimensions along which the political
role and responsibility of firms has varied over time and in
parallel to shifting background ideologies. A first dimen-
sion is territory—or the range of action and responsibility.
Second, we find a striking evolution in the nature of ‘‘ac-
tors’’ at the core of this responsibility. Third, targets have
evolved—reflecting a transformation of those intentions
that motivate the exercise of responsibility. Finally, the
modes through which responsibility has been exercised
have also changed in significant ways. We conclude by
drawing implications for future theorizing on (political)
CSR and stakeholder democracy.
A Changing Global Landscape: A New Political
Turn of CSR?
Even today, most studies theorizing in economics and
management start from the assumption that the business of
business is (only) business (and profits) and that maxi-
mizing shareholder wealth amounts to maximizing societal
wealth. This economic and political paradigm was proba-
bly most clearly expressed by Milton Friedman in his well-
known 1970 New York Times Magazine article, entitled
‘‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits.’’ According to Friedman, because managers are
understood to be the agents of owners-shareholders (prin-
cipals), their responsibility is to those shareholders only
and to the maximization of their profits (Friedman 1970).
Because managers are neither elected nor politically rep-
resentative, they do not have the legitimacy, on the other
hand, to deal with societal and common good issues
(Friedman 1970). Hence, Friedman argues, business cannot
and should not take on social or political responsibilities.
The logic is that of a neat separation between business and
society/politics and of a clear division of labor between
private business actors—who should only be involved in
economic activities and profit maximization—and other
actors, including the state, who can and should take on
political and social roles. With the progress of globaliza-
tion, however, a number of scholars point to blurry
boundaries between business and government (Crane et al.
2004; Marens 2012; Matten and Crane 2005a; Matten et al.
2003; Scherer and Palazzo 2011). The increasing power of
large, often multinational, corporations makes their politi-
cal role and responsibility unavoidable. Globalization also
appears to imply an erosion of state sovereignty and a
weakening of state capacities, which may foster even more
the political role of business (Matten et al. 2003; Prakash
and Griffin 2012; Scherer and Palazzo 2011). In fact, some
scholars assert that ‘‘globalization has changed the social
contract between business and society’’ (Mark-Ungericht
and Weiskopf 2007, p. 286). Others even talk of a para-
digm shift (Palazzo and Scherer 2008).
In that context, a lively debate explores the political
dimension of CSR, corporate citizenship, and business
ethics (Heath et al. 2010; Matten et al. 2003; Scherer and
Palazzo 2007). The core argument is that as corporations
increasingly take on activities conventionally understood to
be the prerogative of governments, even if only to provide
public goods necessary to their proper functioning, they
take on a political role (Matten and Crane 2005a; Scherer
and Palazzo 2007, 2011). When corporations provide
public goods through their CSR programs—clean water,
health, or education—then CSR indeed has a political
dimension (Ite 2004). When corporations seek to address
ethical issues in their global supply chains, CSR again is
about politics (Rotter et al. 2014). Finally, when corpora-
tions get involved in multi-stakeholder rule making, CSR
once more becomes politics (Mena and Palazzo 2012).
In contrast to the idea of corporate responsibility and
citizenship as means to compensate for government failure
stand critics who decry CSR as nothing more than an
instrument used to further private interests (Fooks et al.
2013) and to sustain new forms of imperialism, colonial-
ism, and inequality (Banerjee 2007). Both representations
of CSR point to its political nature but the meaning of the
term ‘‘political’’ is different in each case. We find a con-
tinuum of meanings for ‘‘political’’ between ‘‘serving the
common good’’—often valued positively—and ‘‘at the
service of particularistic interests to the detriment of other
groups’’—perceived more negatively. Critics of contem-
porary CSR highlight the fact that corporations only focus
on a selection of issues and stakeholders they deem
important for their own activities and interests (Banerjee
2011; Devinney 2009; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2011).
Taken for granted or even celebrated in stakeholder and
CSR research, managerial discretion is called upon by
critics who argue that ‘‘it is dangerous to assume that
managers know what is best for society’’ (Buchholz and
Rosenthal 2004, p. 145). Managerial discretion is prob-
lematic because of a lack of legitimacy and accountability
to stakeholders (Buchholz and Rosenthal 2004) and to
society at large (Matten and Crane 2005a; Scherer and
Palazzo 2011). The problem is the non-democratic nature
of valuation and moral judgment in the assessment of
stakeholder interests and their priorities—and this problem
begs the question of the legitimacy of the corporate
stakeholder model.
Strangely enough, while the normative assessment of
CSR as political activity varies significantly, from essen-
tially positive and progressive (Scherer and Palazzo 2007)
to negative and even possibly destructive (Banerjee 2007;
Fleming and Jones 2012; Fooks et al. 2013), the causal
narrative is broadly similar. Across the literature on polit-
ical CSR, contemporary globalization is presented as the
main driver of both CSR and its political role (Banerjee
2007; Matten et al. 2003; Prakash and Griffin 2012;
Scherer and Palazzo 2011). The progress of globalization,
it is argued, comes together with a ‘‘deterritorialization of
social, political and economic interactions’’ that ultimately
generates what Matten and Crane call a significant ‘‘dis-
empowerment of states’’ (Matten and Crane 2005a, p. 171).
This frames the context in which corporations ‘‘take over
many of the roles and actions previously associated with
government’’ and become increasingly involved in
administering ‘‘citizenship rights’’ (Matten and Crane
2005a, pp. 170–171).
Ma¨kinen and colleagues (2012, 2014) highlight the fact
that contemporary conceptions of political CSR are pro-
foundly embedded within the modern liberal political
system. The critique of the ‘‘a-political role of the corpo-
ration’’ (Palazzo and Scherer 2006, p. 72) or even the
development of the notion of ‘‘corporate citizenship’’
(Matten and Crane 2005a) inscribe themselves within
classical liberal political theory (Ma¨kinen and Kourula
2012). While questioning purely ‘‘economic’’ or ‘‘instru-
mental’’ CSR, political CSR scholars still paradoxically
further the liberal assumption that once upon a time eco-
nomic and political spheres were stable and separate and
that political responsibilities were traditionally the pre-
rogative of states and governments. Even critiques of
political CSR and corporate citizenship are in fact likely to
take the liberal paradigm of a clear separation of business
and politics as a starting point (Jones and Haigh 2007; Van
Oosterhout 2005; Willke and Willke 2008). Jones and
Haigh (2007), for example, base their strong critique of the
deployment of corporate citizenship on game theoretic
approaches that take for granted the rational corporation,
along with its profit-seeking motive and economic incen-
tive structures. In a rebuttal to this violent critique, Crane
and Matten underscore that Jones and Haigh engage, in
reality, ‘‘in a nostalgic retreat to a Keynesian postwar
world where the lines between business, government and
civil society were sure and certain’’ (Crane and Matten
2008, p. 23).
Ma¨kinen and colleagues take what we see as an
important step to distance themselves from the powerful
assumptions associated with the ‘‘null hypothesis’’ (Ma¨ki-
nen and Kasanen 2014; Ma¨kinen and Kourula 2012). They
argue that the separation between business and society,
economy and politics, or public and private that we take for
granted today may reflect a particular (and hence contex-
tual) socio-political system. Ma¨kinen and Kourula revive,
in the process, an older sociological and anthropological
tradition that conceives of society as a more complex,
integrated if not ‘‘total’’ phenomenon where the economic,
the social, and the political are all deeply interlocked
(Hirschman 1981; Mauss 1967 [1925]; Polanyi 1944).
In line with Ma¨kinen and colleagues and with this older
intellectual tradition, we draw attention to the plurality of
forms of business–society interactions. We do so by pro-
viding a historical contextualization of contemporary CSR.
We propose that alternative patterns of business–society
interactions in different periods of time reflect, and are
framed by, distinct background ideologies. Such a histori-
cal contextualization of contemporary CSR and of its
associated ideological frame shows that firms are and have
always been political actors. Furthermore, it can contribute,
we suggest, to a deeper understanding of how this political
role has been and is motivated, exerted, legitimated, or
even contested through time. In the process, we can learn
from questions raised and actions (un)taken in the past to
further our understanding of the contemporary political
role and responsibility of firms and their consequences.
Epistemological Assumptions and Methods
Our project in this article is grounded in the epistemolog-
ical conviction that human activity is contextual, socially
constructed, and ideologically framed. Activity, language,
institutions, politics, and practices are historically co-con-
stituted and co-evolve with values and ideologies. Hence,
words and concepts are not mere labels put on the ‘‘essence
of things’’ but ‘‘historical and cultural objects,’’ ‘‘symbolic
systems with their own histories and logics’’—symbolic
systems that reflect particular ideological frames and are at
the same time ‘‘modalities of power and authority’’
(Somers 1995b, p. 232). This kind of epistemological
conviction generates a responsibility for the social scien-
tist—that of uncovering ideological frames behind taken-
for-granted concepts and practices (Somers 1995a). As
Max Weber put it, the social scientist should aim at deep,
embedded understanding (verstehen)—an understanding of
the worldviews or ideologies that constitute or inform
activities, concepts, or interactions, an understanding in
other words ‘‘of the cultural significance of concrete his-
torical events and patterns’’ (Weber 1949 [1904], p. 111).
In order to really ‘‘understand how we think and why we
seem obliged to think in certain ways’’ (Hacking 1990,
p. 362), we need to analyze concepts as being ‘‘words in
their sites’’ (Somers 1995a, p. 113) and as such embedded
both historically and ideologically.
We believe that scholarship on corporate social
responsibility (CSR) has tended to neglect this essential
dimension of social scientific analysis. An important
frontier for scholarship on CSR in general—and on
political CSR in particular—should be to explore the
institutional, political, and ideological dimensions that co-
evolve with contemporary notions and practices of CSR.
We argue here that a historical contextualization of con-
temporary CSR is an important step in that direction. CSR
needs to be understood as a particular and contextual form
of business–society interactions that reflects and reveals
certain institutional and cultural conditions, particular
relations of power and a given ideological and value
grounding.
A Methodological Program: Ideal-Type
Construction and Comparison
To move in that direction, we engage in the construction of
ideal-types for two historical patterns of business–society
interactions that pre-date contemporary CSR. The first
ideal-type, ‘‘paternalism,’’ emerged and developed during
the first and second industrialization and was particularly
prevalent in nineteenth century Europe. We label the sec-
ond ideal-type ‘‘trusteeship.’’ It emerged alongside corpo-
rate and managerial capitalism—hence during the first part
of the twentieth century in the United States. Ideal-type
construction is a methodological program pioneered by
Max Weber and allowing for both an in-depth historical
and contextual understanding (verstehen) as well as for
conceptualization and theory building through comparison
(Weber 1949; Watkins 1952; Doty and Glick 1994; Glaser
2002). An ideal-type is a construct that serves to clarify a
particular logic of action or structure of organization by
extracting from the thickness of empirical situations not
only a pattern of action or structure but also the meaning
system in which those are embedded and ‘‘make sense’’
(Weber 1978 [1922], p. 20). The ideal-type is ‘‘constructed
by abstracting the outstanding features from some histori-
cal complex and by organizing these into a coherent world-
picture’’ (Watkins 1952, p. 23). Hence, ideal-types are
heuristic devices that are neither a faithful image of the real
world nor the projection of an idealized utopia. They are
‘‘mental constructs’’ and in that sense they ‘‘cannot be
found empirically anywhere in reality’’ (Weber 1949
[1904], pp. 91–92). Neither can they be treated as norma-
tive, best practice-like projections. Their ‘‘ideality’’ only
lies in the associated ‘‘simplification and aloofness from
detail’’ (Watkins 1952, p. 23).
A research-design based on ideal-type construction and
comparison is not easy to operationalize but it has many
advantages. It allows the researcher to combine in-depth
understanding of complex and unique historical ‘‘wholes’’
with their reduction and simplification into heuristic con-
structs that then become tools for comparison and con-
ceptualization. The researcher can compare different ideal-
types with each other as well as a particular empirical
situation with a given ideal-type. The complexity of
deploying a research-design based on comparative ideal-
types explains that it is still rarely used, but as a powerful
tool for theory building and conceptualization, it is likely to
elicit growing interest in the coming years (Baden-Fuller
and Morgan 2010; Hernes 2005; Horsfall 2013; Soliva
2007).
This methodological program appeared well suited, in
any case, to our two-dimensional project. We wanted to
uncover, on the one hand, the complex associations
between different patterns of business–society interactions
and specific background ideologies. On the other hand, we
expected to identify similarities, or functional equivalence,
but also striking differences and specificities across these
patterns through time. An easier methodological alternative
would have been to do an in-depth historical case-study of
CSR, exploring both its origins and its development in time
(Skocpol 1984; Yin 2014). We would have then also been
able to uncover the worldview framing contemporary
CSR—and possibly its evolution through time. But the
systematic comparison with different patterns of business–
society interactions and their background ideologies allows
us to point to key differences and surprising similarities
that help us identify the strengths and weaknesses of con-
temporary CSR.
The paternalism and trusteeship periods provide us with
two ideal-types of business–society interactions, which we
can compare and contrast with contemporary CSR. We
could have considered, constructed, and used a number of
other ideal-types. For example, we could have identified
guilds as an alternative pattern of business–society interac-
tions (Kieser 1989). We chose to focus on paternalism and
trusteeship first of all because they correspond to periods of
(relatively) advanced modernity and articulate with forms of
social and economic organization that are close enough to
our own. Furthermore, both periods are particularly inter-
esting as they are both characterized, like our contemporary
CSR period, by a strong political implication of business. By
thus reducing differences between our three periods and
ideal-types, we can hope to capture more easily the simi-
larities and differences with respect to how business exer-
cised political responsibility in each case.
Data Collection and Analysis
Our data sources are mainly secondary material—essen-
tially the work of historians who contributed in-depth
explorations and descriptions of the social and political
roles of business during each period. On nineteenth century
European paternalism, we reviewed a wide-ranging set of
company histories on well-known paternalist firms. We
further built upon an unpublished doctoral dissertation,
which so far represents the most advanced historical con-
tribution on the practices of nineteenth century paternalism
in France (De Bry 1980). We also had a 2-h long interview
with the historian, author of that dissertation. For the
trusteeship era, we had access to secondary material but we
also explored some primary archives—open letters or lec-
tures of key managers and opinion leaders in that period.
This preliminary phase of historical exploration provided
us with the empirical material necessary to construct the
two ideal-types.
We constructed the two ideal-types through ‘‘synthesis
of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present
features’’ (Weber 1949 [1904], p. 90). The richness of the
data was managed and simplified thanks to a structure that
we followed in both cases: (1) the historical context, (2) the
ideological frame, (3) the main political roles and respon-
sibilities of business at the time, and 4) the political
struggles and frictions encountered towards the end of each
period. It is important to understand that the ideal-type
itself is not—and cannot be—a faithful historical depiction
(Weber 1949 [1904]). An ideal-type is a unified construct,
a concept but one that cannot be ‘‘objective’’ as it is always
constructed from a ‘‘point of view,’’ a ‘‘perspective,’’ or a
‘‘set of presuppositions’’ (Weber 1949 [1904], pp. 91–92).
For the purpose of this study, our perspective and our
presuppositions were guided by Matten and Crane’s
(2005a, b) extended view of corporate citizenship that
investigates corporate involvement in the administration of
social, civil, and political rights. According to Matten and
Crane (2005a, p. 170) social rights ‘‘consist of those rights
that provide the individual with the freedom to participate
in society, such as the right to education, health care, or
various aspects of welfare.’’ Civil rights consist of those
rights that ‘‘provide freedom from abuses and interference
by third parties (most notably governments), among the
most important of which are the rights to own property,
exercise freedom of speech, and engage in ‘‘free’’ mar-
kets.’’ Political rights include ‘‘the right to vote or the right
to hold office and, generally speaking, entitle the individual
to take part in the process of collective will formation in
the public sphere.’’ We explored our data with these dif-
ferent roles in mind and used this framing as a red thread
connecting the various ideal-types beyond their differences
and specificities.
Once constructed, historical ideal-types become
methodological tools or measuring rods allowing us to
understand and characterize concrete periods, events, and
situations by confronting them with a particular ideal-type.
But it is also interesting to compare different ideal-types
between themselves to underscore, beyond the variability
of contexts, similarity through functional equivalence as
well as remaining and consequential differences (Hall
2007). This is what we do in this article by confronting our
two historical ideal-types with contemporary CSR (that
becomes a third ideal-type in the process)—and showing
how we have in each case alignment between particular
patterns of business–society interactions and specific ide-
ological frames. Using the different forms of firm
involvement defined by Matten and Crane (2005a) as a red
thread, we have tried to systematically draw out similarities
and differences, between and across ideal-types, with
respect to how business took on political responsibility
(i.e., catered to political, social, and civil rights) in each
case. This systematic comparison allowed us to identify
four principal dimensions along which patterns of
business–society interactions varied over time—territory,
actors, targets, and modes of political responsibility.
‘‘Territory’’ refers to the geographical reach and scope of
political responsibility. ‘‘Actors’’ point to the main carriers
of political responsibility. ‘‘Targets’’ are the ‘‘objects’’ at
the receiving end of (and hence reveal the intentions of)
political responsibility. And ‘‘modes’’ reflect the different
ways in which political responsibility is exercised (e.g.,
Young 2004).
In summary, the construction and comparison of ideal-
types allows us to both historicize and de-naturalize con-
temporary CSR by confronting it to alternative patterns of
business–society interactions and suggesting both func-
tional equivalence and striking differences. This con-
frontation makes it possible to think of bundles and
configurations—connecting a form of business–society
interactions with certain institutional, cultural, political,
and ideological traits.
Nineteenth Century Paternalist Business and its
Political Role
As a pattern of business–society interactions, paternalism
emerged and developed in close articulation with a par-
ticular form of capitalism. The heyday of paternalism was
the mid-to-late 19th century, with a particularly strong
inscription in Europe (Hobsbawm 1996; Noiriel 1988; Reid
1985).
Historical Context: Industrialization and Personal
Capitalism
As the European continent was going through its early
phases of industrialization, from the late eighteenth century
throughout the nineteenth century, an early step was the
development of the putting-out system (Nussbaum 2002
[1933]). Intermediaries organized, contracted out to, and
pooled production from individuals and households who
worked from their homes (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985). Pro-
gressively, the idea of bringing producers together in the
same physical space—with a view to increasing produc-
tivity and control but also to exploiting technological
developments—imposed itself. And the factory system
came to replace almost everywhere the putting-out system
(Hounshell 1984; Nussbaum 2002 [1933]; Pollard 1965).
The emergence of the modern factory system was a pro-
found revolution with major economic but also social and
potentially political consequences.
The development of the factory system in Europe took
place within the frame of personal capitalism (Colli et al.
2003). Factories belonged to firms that were under the
strong control and oversight of individuals or small groups
of owners. Legal structures became more sophisticated by
the end of the nineteenth century. On the whole, though,
the joint stock corporate form remained rare. Rather, per-
sonal legal forms, partnerships, or hybrid structures where
strong owners/decision makers opened their capital to
passive investors were more widespread.
As Europe went through its first and second industrial
revolutions, economic transformations and their substantial
and often dramatic societal consequences triggered reac-
tions. The socialist critique in particular denounced pro-
found social disruptions. The break-up of families and rural
communities associated with mass migration towards the
industrial centers where factories were located, child labor,
alcohol consumption and violence, out-of-wedlock preg-
nancies, poor hygiene, exhaustion from overwork but also
work-related accidents and sicknesses with no protection or
compensation pointed to the dark side of increased pro-
ductivity and control (Engels 1987 [1844]). The increasing
intensity of that critique combined with a genuine preoc-
cupation for profoundly disrupting social trends to foster
action and organization within parts of the European
business classes. Paternalism flourished in that context
(Magnusson 2000; Nielsen 1994).
The Paternalist Reaction and Its Ideological Frame:
Authoritarian-Owner Benevolence
The common logic behind the paternalist reaction reflected
a deeply ingrained ideological frame that we label here
‘‘authoritarian-owner benevolence.’’ The firm—and the
factory—was understood to be an extension of the owners
and their families. Ownership was a source of uncontested
power—just like fatherhood at the time. Workers were like
children who needed the authority but also at times the
guidance and benevolence of the owner/father. Power and
wealth implied responsibility with regard to the employees/
children. The space in and around the firm should be pro-
tected, as much as possible, from external political
encroachments of different kinds. And as a consequence,
owners should proactively engage in any political and
social activity that would keep external scrutiny and pres-
sure at bay.
Within this broad background ideology, there were
variants that reflected distinct but compatible influences.
We identify essentially three. First, some expressions of
paternalism had clear elective affinities with the ‘‘civiliz-
ing, white man’s burden’’ associated, for example, with the
colonial enterprise or with progressive benevolence of a
Benthamian type (Quinn 1997). The paternalist project
reflected, in that context, the sense of responsibility that
should come with a (perceived) sense of (racial/class)
superiority (Gillet 1976). A second strand of paternalism
was connected to a Christian form of humanism that
underscored the urgent necessity to reconcile the intense
development of capitalism with respect for human beings
as divine creatures. For example, Le´on Harmel, owner of
textile mills in the North of France (today in Belgium), saw
his company as a ‘‘Christian corporation.’’ He targeted the
creation of a physical and spiritual community that looked
to ‘‘the well-being of the workers’’ and the ‘‘prosperity of
the enterprise’’ (Coffey 2003; Harmel 1889, p. 37). A third
strand of paternalism was anchored in the intellectual tra-
dition pioneered by Charles Fourier or Robert Owen. Jean-
Baptiste Godin, who founded the stove company bearing
his name, constructed, for example, the structures for a
community—the Familiste`re de Guise—with the objective
of reconciling economic production and social progress
(Lallement 2009).
Those distinct intellectual influences all provided strong
motives for paternalist-type intervention. The ideological
driver, however, was often combined with more pragmatic
motives, reflecting the fact that firms needed certain
resources, including healthy and mobilized workers, quiet
and thriving communities, which they could not, in that
period, take for granted. On the ground, those different
strands of paternalism translated into relatively similar
practices. The logic was that the authority of the
owner/father implied a certain form of responsibility to the
members/employees/children of the firm that went well
beyond the provision of a salary. In some of the most
extreme variants of the paternalist experience, the firm
became fused with the geographical community in which it
was embedded. Brede Klaedefabrik north of Copenhagen,
Denmark, the Stumm family in the Saar region, Germany,
Philips in Eindhoven, Netherlands, Schneider in Le Creu-
sot, France, the tire manufacturer, Michelin in the city of
Clermont-Ferrand, France, and Gustaf Adolf Serlachius
Company in Ma¨ntta¨, Finland are all typical examples of
how paternal employers across Europe took on social and
political responsibilities towards the local community by
creating sometimes entire factory towns (De Bry 1980;
Gueslin 1993; Kalb 1997; Ma¨kinen and Kasanen 2014;
Ma¨kinen and Kourula 2012; Nielsen 1994; Van Du¨lmen
1989).
Political Roles and Responsibilities
The political roles and responsibilities of nineteenth cen-
tury paternalist firms were broad. They included the pro-
duction of public goods and services, the defense of
citizenship rights, and, at times, initiatives to foster the
democratic empowerment of employees. They also trans-
lated into rule making and monitoring, within firms but
also beyond. As we have just underscored, the ideology in
which paternalism was inscribed explains that nineteenth
century employers considered this political role a personal
(and firm) duty and often even a moral obligation (De Bry
1980, p. 303).
Administering Social Rights Through the Production
of Public Goods
Most paternalist employers provided public goods of a
social welfare nature—typically health care, retirement
provisions, child-care, and family-connected purchasing
power (e.g., De Bry 1980; Nielsen 1994; Reid 1985;
Roberts 1958). For example, Le´on Harmel understood his
obligations to the worker who lived on site to include
caring for the family in case of illness, accident, or death of
a family member. He also made sure that the worker, his
wife, and children performed tasks according to their
ability and that they would have sufficient time left to
fulfill their duties to their family and to the Church (Coffey
2003). Faced with high levels of childbirth mortality,
paternalist employers provided financial assistance,
reduced working hours, and organized health and dietary
workshops for pregnant women (De Bry 1980). Paternalist
employers often granted their workers child or family
allowances to encourage larger-size families. Companies
also built or financially contributed to the building of col-
lective institutions, such as hospitals, old-age homes, or
schools. An observer of the Brede factory community in
Denmark described it this way:
All the salaried staff and workers live in houses
belonging to the firm and on land belonging to the
firm, and for their needs and comfort the firm has set
up a library, savings bank, a canteen, a bath house, a
school for the children (about 150), a kindergarten for
the infants (aged 2-7) and a nursery for the tots (up to
the age of 2). (cited in Nielsen 1994, p. 70).
Similarly, within the Godin familiste`re, workers enjoyed
good housing, hygiene, health, education, quality food, clean
water, and air, tranquility, etc. (Lallement 2009). For Jean-
Baptiste Godin, these public goods were the ‘‘equivalents of
wealth’’ and they should be deployed to deal with the ‘‘social
predicaments of industrialization’’ (Guiol 2000).
Paternal employers, furthermore, tried to reduce the risk
of work accidents. They offered pension plans, unem-
ployment benefits, health insurance, and corporate saving
schemes (De Bry 1980). They organized or fostered the
creation of food and staples’ cooperatives to reduce the
costs of first necessity products. Some paternal employers
even created their own currency and operated their own
police force, as the Serlachius Company in Finland
illustrates:
The factory owners of Ma¨ntta¨ have hired the first
police officers and built the first fire department. The
company maintained the phone network until 1954.
The company put efforts into building roads and
railways. It owned ships, brought the first car to
Ma¨ntta¨ in 1913 and maintained the municipality’s
roads and streets up to 1948. The inhabitants bought
their groceries in the company store and paid them
with ‘Serlachius money’. (Palkkatyo¨la¨inen magazine
cited in Ma¨kinen and Kourula 2013, p. 226)
From the Provision of Moral Goods to the Defense of Civil
Rights
The production of public goods was often tightly connected
with the provision of moral goods. On an everyday basis,
paternal employers sought to moralize employees, and
material privileges were often seen as a compensation for
the ‘‘moral’’ worker. For example, employers built chur-
ches or chapels on company grounds and encouraged the
reading of ‘‘good’’ newspapers—‘‘good’’ being defined by
their own appreciation. They built schools for the children
of their employees and kept tight ideological and moral
control over those schools. For example, the schools
financed by paternalist Christian employers were operated
by nuns—which ensured a strong moral and religious
influence on the education of children (De Bry 1980).
Paternalist employers would make sure that children
actually attended these schools, including through coercive
pressure on the family, which could take the form of
conditional social welfare benefits (De Bry 1980; Nielsen
1994). The protection of civil rights was thus rather con-
strained and conditional upon the alignment of workers
with employers’ values.
However, later in the nineteenth century and in reaction
to the increasing socialist critique that was bound to influ-
ence their workers, a number of paternalist leaders became
active in promoting a certain empowerment of workers.
Le´on Harmel, for example, played an active role in the
creation of Christian trade unionism in France and estab-
lished himself as a social reformer (Coffey 2003). Jean-
Baptiste Godin was among the most progressive industri-
alists of his generation (Godin 1881). He went so far as to
create a ‘‘work and capital association,’’ through which he
turned the property of the means of production over to
workers and advocated that everybody should receive
according to their needs. This was a step to enfranchise
workers and free them from the yoke of paternalist
employers. In England, the Tory social reformer, Lord
Ashley, called upon the government to take over the defi-
nition and enforcement of employee protection. The idea
was to disconnect civil rights and social benefits from direct
dependence to a paternalist employer (Roberts 1958). But in
the 1840s, Lord Ashley’s plea went unheeded.
Rule Making, Monitoring, and Control of Political Rights
Paternalist owners being the ‘‘providence’’ of their
employees set the rules single-handedly within their firms.
They also often had an impact at the local community or
even at the national level as they exercised political man-
dates. Euge`ne Schneider, for example, was mayor of the
city where his firm was located, member of the National
Assembly between 1845 and 1848 and even Minister for
agriculture and commerce in 1851 (De Bry 1980, p. 400).
Paternalist owners, hence, could be directly involved in
local and national rule making.
Paternalist strategies often had a strong control dimen-
sion. Even though Jean-Baptiste Godin was very progres-
sive, his ‘‘social palace’’ (Palais Social) at the heart of the
familiste`re was an architectural expression of how pater-
nalist employers monitored and controlled employees. It
evoked the Panopticon, which Jeremy Bentham had
developed for the purpose of complete surveillance in
hospitals, mad houses, or prisons (Bentham 1995).
According to Godin, detailed planning of duties according
to one’s abilities combined with tight control would bring
order and coherence and eliminate conflicts (Lallement
2009). As said before, paternal employers who controlled
factory towns had the strongest leverage, monitoring
employees well into their private lives. They restricted the
journals employees could read, made them go to church,
and their children to school. They even organized leisure
time by structuring, sponsoring, and even imposing par-
ticipation into certain activities (sports, cooking, etc.).
Some imposed strict rules for house cleaning that were
controlled through regular visits (Noiriel 1988). Others
even used their own private police forces to control
workers. When violent strikes erupted at the mines of
Blanzy in France in 1882, the director delegated the
recruiting process to his private police to ensure that new
hires did not ‘‘infiltrate’’ socialist ideology but instead
shared the employer’s values (De Bry 1980). Only with the
crisis of paternalism did employers come to accept a
widening of their employees’ political rights, through the
development, for example, of non-company trade unions.
Towards a Crisis of Paternalism and the Rise
of the Welfare State
At the turn of the twentieth century, paternalism was in
crisis. The increasing influence of the socialist critique that
translated into a worldwide organization of the labor
movement was an important driver for the questioning of
paternalism as a pattern of business–society interactions
(Katznelson and Zolberg 1996). There were many violent
strikes and brutal riots in that period (Debouzy 1988;
Noiriel 1988; Tone 1997). Employees actively denounced
illegitimate forms of control and abuses of power from
paternalist employers (Joyce 1980; Roberts 1958). Pater-
nalism was criticized as a masquerade and the expression
of manipulation, leading to the structural infantilization of
workers. It was denounced as a dangerous scam—where
the class struggle was being diluted in ‘‘heated housing
programs’’ and ‘‘sports facilities.’’ In parallel, large parts of
the working classes and certain strands of socialism
mobilized in favor of an alternative—the welfare state.
Throughout Europe, political actors, particularly at the
national level, questioned the legitimacy of business con-
trol over local community affairs. They looked for ways to
constrain the authority of paternalist employers (Reid 1985,
p. 598). Increasingly, intrusive governments forced them-
selves into what had until then been (private) company
territories. Paternalist employers fought to keep their
authority and control by complying proactively with soci-
etal demands for better working conditions and greater
respect of workers’ political and civic rights. For example,
the mining company of Blanzy created a workers associ-
ation in 1909, which at least in appearance was run by
workers (De Bry 1980, p. 304).
But this was not enough and the welfare state progres-
sively imposed itself in Europe as an alternative to the
strong political engagement hitherto characteristic of pri-
vate firms (Beck 1995). In the social democratic view of
the welfare state, citizens (and not workers) are granted
rights—from education, health, social security, unem-
ployment, and even pension rights. The state becomes in
that context responsible for eradicating unemployment and
poverty but also wage-dependency (Esping-Andersen
1990; Quadagno 1987):
Laws and regulations of the late nineteenth century –
mainly based on liberal or social conservative ideas –
formed a public sector which became an alternative
to private responsibility for workers (De Geer et al.
2009, p. 274).
National governments introduced labor reforms and set
themselves the task to control social problems at the national
level. These measures were motivated in part by the
willingness to decrease the potential abuse of power and
control of paternalist employers and came together with a
partial withdrawal of business from the social and political
sphere—a political de-responsabilization of business.
American Corporate Capitalism and Managerial
Trusteeship
Another pattern of business–society interactions where
business played a significant role was managerial trustee-
ship. Trusteeship emerged and co-evolved together with
corporate and managerial capitalism, during the first half of
the twentieth century in the United States.
Historical Context: The Emergence of Corporate
and Managerial Capitalism
At the turn of the twentieth century, the American capitalist
landscape went through a ‘‘great transformation’’ associ-
ated with corporatization and rapid ‘‘managerialization’’
(Berle and Means 1932; Chandler 1977; Roy 1997; Sklar
1980). This ‘‘great transformation’’ had no equivalent
anywhere else in the world and the form of capitalist
organization that emerged then was peculiar to the United
States. This emergent form of capitalism had a number of
defining features (Djelic and Amdam 2007).
The large-size and capital-intensive firm was one of its
key markers (Chandler 1977, 1990) and it was associated
with an oligopolistic understanding of competition policed
by antitrust regulation (McCraw 1997). The constitution of
large firms co-evolved with a change in legal status: the joint
stock corporation with dispersed ownership imposed itself
(Roy 1997; Sklar 1980). Those corporations were listed on
stock exchanges where they found the capital they required
(Navin and Sears 1953). Professional managers—without
ownership legitimacy—increasingly imposed themselves as
key decision makers (Berle and Means 1932). This separa-
tion between ownership and control was a major revolution.
It triggered the emergence of a profession—management—
and the structuring of an organizational field around it
(McKenna 2006; Sutton et al. 1956).
The consequence of this revolution was a profound re-
invention of the dominant form of capitalism in the United
States (Djelic and Amdam 2007; Sklar 1980). Well until
the second half of the nineteenth century, American capi-
talism had been of the proprietary-competitive type and
hence quite similar to European forms of capitalism. Most
industries were structured around small or medium-sized
firms. Personal and family ownership combined with a
discourse championing free competition that was, however,
mitigated by the reality of cartel-like strategies that
attempted to curb competition and its problematic conse-
quences (Djelic 1998). In just a few decades, American
capitalism came to be re-invented around very large-size
firms, oligopolistic competition, corporate ownership, and
the managerialization of decision making. The transfor-
mation was striking indeed and highly consequential (Berle
and Means 1932; Sklar 1980).
Trusteeship and Its Ideological Frame: Techno-
Managerial Efficiency
While this form of capitalism was being institutionalized,
discussions were intense as to its consequences.
Contradictory notions had to be reconciled—‘‘bigness’’ on
the one hand with an axiomatic belief in competition on the
other but also the disappearance of owners (replaced by
invisible, dispersed, and un-involved shareholders) with a
sense of corporate responsibility.
The process took time and was conflictual but a social
compromise finally emerged. This social compromise was
the background ideology that framed trusteeship as an
emerging pattern of business–society interactions. We label
it ‘‘techno-managerial efficiency.’’ ‘‘Efficiency’’ was the
central notion in that social compromise, allowing for the
reconciliation of ‘‘bigness’’ with ‘‘free competition.’’ Effi-
ciency was perceived to create a positive dynamic for the
consumer that largely compensated for the reduction in
competition. Since ownership had essentially dissolved
into the holding of pieces of paper, managers inherited
power. This power, particularly because of the large size of
firms, had to be coupled with significant responsibility.
And this responsibility extended well beyond the bound-
aries of the firm. It was conceived as a ‘‘quasi-public
responsibility’’ and, as a consequence, corporations
(through their managers) should become major political
actors both on the national and even further on the inter-
national scene. This political role was understood in
managerial-technocratic terms, the idea being to tackle
broad political issues also through managerial ‘‘efficiency’’
and professionalization.
As the size and number of corporations increased
rapidly in the first decades of the twentieth century, their
social significance became clearer (Heald 1970, p. 61). In
an article written in 1932 and titled ‘‘For Whom are Cor-
porate Managers Trustees,’’ Edwin Merrick Dodd, a Har-
vard Law School Professor put it clearly:
Modern large-scale industry has given to the man-
agers of our principal corporations enormous power
over the welfare of wage earners and consumers,
particularly the former. Power over the lives of others
tends to create on the part of those most worthy to
exercise it a sense of responsibility (Dodd 1932,
p. 1157).
As management developed, in parallel, into a quasi-
profession, this new position of powerful mediator had to
be defined along with associated responsibilities. The
Harvard Business Review (HBR), first published in 1922,
and the American Management Association (AMA),
established in 1923, played a key role in that respect. A
1923 article of the AMA journal, the Management Review,
stated the following: ‘‘We are beginning to regard those
who occupy executive positions as having something in the
nature of quasi-public responsibility’’ (Heald 1970, p. 64).
The 1929 crisis only reinforced the urgency of discussions
on and around the responsibility of corporations and their
leaders, the new ‘‘managers.’’ The concentration of
power—economic, financial, but also political—in the
hands of a small number of firms became all the more
striking and problematic as conditions were worsening for
many across the country.
This period of American capitalism has sometimes been
referred to as the ‘trusteeship management’ era (Hay and
Gray 1974) and we take over that label. Elbert H. Gary,
President and Chairman of the Board of the US Steel
Company argued in 1921 that managers occupied a ‘‘po-
sition of balance’’ and were in fact ‘‘trustees for investors,
employees, employers, consumers, or customers, com-
petitors, and all others who may be interested in or affected
by, the actions or attitudes of the managers’’ (cited in Heald
1970, p. 100). The manager had a ‘‘fiduciary duty’’ in other
words towards many different groups and in fact towards
society broadly understood. In striking contrast to what
Friedman would claim in 1970, professional managers
seemed perfectly legitimate in that period to make deci-
sions not only on behalf of their companies but also on
behalf of multiple stakeholder groups.
Political Roles and Responsibilities
In that context, corporations—through their managers—
were hence called upon to take on political roles and
responsibilities of different kinds but all of significance. As
they inscribed themselves in the peculiar ideological frame
we have just described, those roles and responsibilities
became justified and legitimate.
Social Rights: Serving the Public Interest through
Community Chests
As the management profession was being institutionalized,
the idea that corporations—through their managers—had
the duty to serve the public interest came to be clearly
articulated. The Harvard Business School that became in
the 1920s a leading ‘‘producer’’ of professional managers
played a key role in that respect (Khurana 2010). Wallace
B. Donham, Dean of the School, was adamant that the key
challenge of the times was to create the conditions for the
emergence of a socially responsible managerial class that
would know how to mobilize corporate capitalism to serve
the public interest broadly understood:
Unless more of our business leaders learn to exercise
their powers and responsibilities with a definitely
increased sense of responsibility toward other groups
in the community, unless without great lapse of time
there is through the initiative of such men an important
socializing of business, our civilization may well head
for one of its periods of decline (Donham 1927).
Similarly, Leverett Lyon, an official of the Chicago
Association of Industry and Commerce, suggested that
business education had ‘‘to make crystal clear…that busi-
ness does not exist for itself but is a device which society
uses and modifies for the accomplishment of social pur-
poses’’ (Lyon 1922, cited in Heald 1970, p. 79).
Calls for a particular kind of corporate ‘citizenship’
were made as early as in the 1920s and in fact well before
the Great Depression (Eberstadt 1973, p. 22). Owen D.
Young, who was then Chairman of General Electric and
representative of a generation of public minded business-
men and managers put it this way:
Customers have a right to demand that a concern so
large shall not only do its business honestly and
properly, but, further, that it shall meet its public
obligations and perform its public duties—in a word,
vast as it is, that it should be a good citizen (Young
1929).
A concrete form in which this corporate responsibility
manifested itself was through the community chest move-
ment (Heald 1970). As the individual philanthropy of the
great American Robber Barons (Carnegie or Rockefeller)
gave way to corporate philanthropy, corporate managers
increasingly became involved in the development of
community fund drives designed to support social
needs—e.g., health or education (Zunz 2011). For example,
‘‘massive fundraising campaigns were organized between
1921 and 1925 to endow universities’’ (Hoffman 2007,
p. 67). In addition, corporations also offered their workers
pension plans, consumer credit, unemployment insurance,
or profit sharing schemes and they ‘‘engaged in public
works and philanthropic projects such as community health
and welfare, the arts and education’’ (Hoffman 2007,
p. 66). By the end of the 1920s, (corporate) business,
through its professional managers, had become in the
United States a ‘‘key social institution’’ for the well-being
of the community (Heald 1970, p. 198).
Defending a Form of Civilization and Its Associated Civil
Rights
The unprecedented power and size of American corpora-
tions made salient, already in the 1910s and 1920s, their
political nature and role (Dodd 1932; Donham 1927). This
political role was sometimes connected to the increasing
power of the United States on the world scene—and to the
responsibility this entailed in the face of ever increasing
risks and threats (Spector 2008; Yogev 2001). From a
geopolitical perspective, the political and social involve-
ment of American corporations hence could have a stabi-
lizing aim. It could help save ‘‘American liberalism’’ from
the threats and challenges it was facing and this would be
done through
…socialization of industry from within on a higher
ethical plane, not socialism or communism, not
government operation or the exercise of political
power, but rather the development from within of
effective social control (Donham 1927, p. 407).
In his 1927 HBR article, ‘‘The Social Significance of
Business,’’ Donham acknowledged the urgency of facing
up to this upcoming ‘‘threat to civilization’’:
The discontent with the existing condition of things is
perhaps more widespread than ever before in history.
There is a close analogy between the position of the
governing class in the earlier, simple societies
[France and Russia at the time of their revolutions]
and that of the business group in our present complex
social organization (Donham 1927, p. 406).
Donham went on, making it clear that it was the
responsibility of corporate managers to protect ‘‘the
continuance of our economic order and its sane evolution’’
(Donham 1927, p. 407). Starting with the First World War,
an important political responsibility of American business
was seen to be, nationally and internationally, the cham-
pioning of an American way of life—as defined through
mass-production and mass-consumption in a (corporate)
market society. American business had, in other words, the
responsibility to defend a particular kind of civilization in
the face of mounting threats. Henry Ford proposed his own
interpretation of this responsibility, first strongly contested
then widely supported and defended. He asserted that
progress (economic, social, and moral) was fueled by mass-
consumption and that the responsibility of business was
thus to offer quality products at low prices. From that
perspective, ‘‘the logic of mass production thus reconciled
the private interest of the manufacturer with the well-being
of the consumer, and, ultimately, with society at large’’
(Heald 1970, p. 89).
Political Rights: Ministering to the Needs and Desires
of a Broad Constituency
The projection of management as having the capacity and
the duty to serve the public interest and hence to be a
‘‘trustee’’ for the interests of multiple parties was signifi-
cantly challenged by the onset of the 1929 crisis. The early
years following the crisis were years of bitter disappoint-
ment as it became plain that corporate managers had not
adequately served and protected the public interest—quite
to the contrary. The Great Depression revived anti-big
business sentiment in the United States—within civil
society but also among politicians (Roosevelt 1936). On
the side of corporations and their leaders, one of the
reactions to re-establish public legitimacy was to take on a
greater share of responsibility in a situation of immense
social distress.
With a view to improve public relations, Ford’s ‘‘gospel
of production’’ turned into the ‘‘gospel of service.’’ Henry
Gantt, an early management consultant, defined ‘‘service’’
as a way to ensure ‘‘more democratic principles in busi-
ness’’ (Hoffman 2007, p. 62). This new gospel of service
was quite demanding on managers:
The gospel of service was clearly more ambitious
than the gospel of production. It demanded of its
apostles both a sense of trusteeship and a desire to put
one’s will and work at the service of others (Fortune
editors 1949, p. 156).
The gospel of service was picked up by emerging public
relations firms and advertising agencies who saw the broad
public as their constituency. They committed to determin-
ing the wants of this constituency and ensuring that
manufacturers would satisfy them:
Just as citizens had representatives in Congress
looking out for their needs and interests, so con-
sumers had a representative in the highest councils of
business, demanding that their desires be satisfied
(Marchand 1985, p. 30).
Greater involvement in the Community Chest movement
was another path to demonstrating ‘‘service’’ (Elwood
1932; Heald 1970; Zunz 2011). To palliate resentment, but
also to keep government at bay, large corporations rushed
into ‘‘responsible’’ corporate philanthropy. In 1932, Louis
E. Kirstein, President of the Associated Jewish Philan-
thropies of Boston, candidly expressed the rationale:
Either we must give generously and voluntarily to our
social agencies or we must stop whining when gov-
ernment is forced to impose the added taxes required
for succor until jobs appear (Kirstein 1932).
Corporate spending increased from $2,539,819 by 2652
firms in 13 cities in 1920 to $12,954,769 by 33,977 firms in
129 cities in 1929 (Heald 1970, p. 18). By then, business
contributions had become a key element in the chests’
funding movement not only in the form of monetary
donations but also in the form of strong personal involve-
ment leading to the creation of broad networks that
connected local chests into a nationally organized charity.
However, philanthropy did not prove sufficient to deal
with mass unemployment after 1929. Starting in the early
1930s, the New Deal marked an assertive attempt, on the
part of governmental authorities, to impose themselves on
the territory of social welfare. A bitter struggle opposed the
government to business and community chests in the 1930s
on the question of tax deductions for corporate donations.
The stake was the continued capacity of business to
maintain its vast community spending and community
organizing. The New Deal government was not in favor of
tax deduction schemes as it sought to constrain corporate
influence in social and political matters and to expand
instead the role and responsibilities of government. Even-
tually, after years of lobbying from business and commu-
nity chests, the Five Per Cent Amendment was voted in
1935. This allowed companies to deduct payments to
charitable organizations for up to 5 % of their taxable
income. This legitimated the use of corporate funds for
social purposes but also appeased critics of corporate giv-
ing within and around firms—corporate philanthropy
became ‘‘good for business’’ as it reduced the overall tax
bill (Hoffman 2007, p. 67).
Questioning Trusteeship and the Assertion
of Government
During the 1910s and 1920s, trade associations played an
important role—along with the new business schools—as a
‘‘professionalizing force’’ (Heald 1970, p. 92). They were
at the forefront in pushing the notion of (corporate) man-
agers as legitimate professional trustees for the public
interest. They set industry standards and were active in
establishing ethical codes of conduct. They also justified
business self-regulation as the most (cost-)effective pattern
of regulation—hence serving the common and public
interest. Already in the 1920s, though, a number of critics
were questioning this. The economist J.M. Clark, for
example, called in 1926 for ‘‘social accounting’’—arguing
that the current situation where the private sector was in
charge of its own control could not protect the interests of
the public at large.
After 1929, the federal government became increasingly
assertive—with the large corporations being one of its
main targets. As FD Roosevelt is believed to have said then
in private corridors ‘‘we have to save capitalism from
itself’’ (Schlesinger 1958). A number of business leaders
tried to fight back—attempting to protect private business
and its self-defined political roles and responsibilities from
encroachments by the New Deal government, particularly
as the latter was deploying an ambitious regulatory pro-
gram (Katznelson 2014). Shortly before the 1936 elections,
Colby M. Chester of General Mills called business to do all
it could to ‘‘win public approbation’’ (Heald 1970, p. 194).
Other business leaders chose a different path. By the end
of the 1930s, some of the most emblematic managers of
large American corporations came to re-invent what was
meant by the political involvement of managers. The New
Deal and its ambitious project of national flexible planning
created opportunities for those managers to take their sense
of political duty to a new level. An exemplary illustration
of that evolution is the Committee for Economic Devel-
opment (CED) (Collins 1981). The CED was created in
1942 by a group of progressive businessmen together with
the American Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones. Paul
Hoffman, Chairman of the Studebaker Corporation, Wil-
liam Benton from the advertising firm of Benton and
Bowles, and Marion Folsom, treasurer of the Eastman
Kodak Company, were all, among others, founding mem-
bers. The agenda of the CED was to involve the American
business community in national planning for the postwar
period and to determine the conditions necessary to pre-
serve employment. The group of progressive businessmen
who made up the CED had come to terms with the New
Deal. They accepted a degree of government intervention
in the economy and recognized that the state should lead
the way when it came to social welfare and the adminis-
tration of social, civil, and political rights (Collins 1981).
The 1929 crisis and its partial de-legitimation of cor-
porate managers’ claims to trusteeship opened the way to
an increasingly assertive federal government. This evolu-
tion contributed to the delineation of a sharp boundary
between what came to be defined as the responsibility of
business (serving the interests of the firm and later on of
shareholders in particular) and what pertained of a politi-
cal/social sphere. Even if corporations and their managers
could be called upon to take on parts of those political and
social responsibilities, the idea that they should be doing
this as surrogates of the state emerged during that period
and came to progressively impose itself.
Discussion: Contextualizing Contemporary
Political CSR
Our ideal–typical exploration of two distinct historical
patterns of business–society interactions shows that firms
had played significant social and political roles well before
the contemporary period of neoliberal globalization. We
propose the idea of contextual and functionally equivalent
patterns that inscribe themselves in distinct ideological
frames.
Learning from Two Historical Ideal-Types
of Business–Society Interactions
In nineteenth century Europe, paternalist employers created
and sustained public goods and institutions, provided
material and welfare benefits of various kinds, attending to
the needs of workers and their families from ‘‘cradle to
grave.’’ They imposed moral and ideological ‘‘guidance,’’
shaping the context in which workers and their families
could enjoy civil rights. They also set rules for entire
communities within and around their factories, closely
controlling and monitoring employees not only at work but
also well into their private lives. By the turn of the twen-
tieth century, an organized labor movement influenced in
part by the socialist critique and increasingly assertive
national governments came to scrutinize and question the
legitimacy of the strong political engagement of private
business. Key arguments were that paternalism led to the
structural infantilization of workers and that it gave
employers too much (illegitimate) power and discretion.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, as Ameri-
can capitalism went through its great transformation, the
social and political responsibility of corporations was
source of intense discussions. The size and power of those
corporations implied, it was argued, great social signifi-
cance—and, as a consequence, carried responsibilities.
Since ownership had essentially dissolved into the holding
of pieces of paper, the emerging group of professional
managers took over this power and associated responsi-
bilities. Those professional managers were supposed to be
‘‘trustees’’ of the public interest, with a responsibility to
balance the interests of multiple groups. They were also
expected to contribute to the defense, both nationally and
internationally, of a particular form of civilization.
Through the active coordination of a nation-wide philan-
thropy movement, they furthermore indirectly framed the
context for collective and civic action on a large scale. The
1929 crisis and the ensuing de-legitimation of corporate
managers’ claims to trusteeship opened the way for an
increasingly assertive federal government. FD Roosevelt’s
New Deal project had in part the objective to affirm the
pre-eminence of the state on social and political territories.
It could be seen, from that perspective, as an attempt to
assert government’s responsibility for the common good
and to contain the pretensions of business on that front.
The empirical exploration showed that business
assumed, in both periods, strong social and political
responsibilities. The ‘‘null hypothesis’’ that business and
government, economics and politics were (by nature)—or
should be—clearly separated could be argued to emerge, in
fact, at the end of each period, during the rise to promi-
nence of the welfare state in Europe and during the con-
frontation, in the 1930s, between the New Deal
government and American business. The historical con-
textualization of contemporary CSR and its political role
presented above allows us to put into perspective the taken-
for-granted separation of private and public spheres that
serves as a benchmark for current theorizing on the polit-
ical role of CSR. We propose an alternative ‘‘null
hypothesis’’—business and state responsibilities are tightly
interconnected, often blurred and always being negotiated.
Firms play today as they did in the past important political
roles. Hence, globalization is not per se the driver of the
political role of business (Whelan 2012). Nevertheless, as
the embodiment of neoliberal ideology, contemporary
globalization shifts the ways in which business engages in
various political but also social roles.
Neoliberal Globalization and Its Significant
Moderating Role
‘‘Globalization’’ is an oft-debated concept that has been
associated with diverse definitions. We connect it here to
two main trends. First, the globalization we are talking
about is ‘‘neoliberal’’ (Campbell and Pedersen 2001). The
onset of this contemporary wave of globalization parallels
the global spread of the neoliberal agenda that became, in
the same period, integrated with corporate capitalism
(Djelic 2006; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). Neoliberal
globalization has been characterized by a powerful trend
towards the maximization of shareholder value, as we
argued above, and towards marketization. The term
‘‘marketization’’ refers both to market ideologies and
market-oriented reforms. Contemporary market ideology
reflects the belief that markets are of superior efficiency for
the allocation of goods and resources. Market-oriented
reforms are those policies fostering the emergence and
development of markets and weakening, in parallel, alter-
native institutional arrangements (Djelic 2006; Simmons
and Elkins 2004). A second defining feature of contem-
porary globalization is the associated density of regulatory
and governance activities with a transnational scope and
reach (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Levi-Faur and
Jordana 2005). Many different actors are involved in these
activities—states but also multinational corporations,
international organizations, and non-governmental organi-
zations. An important role for those multi-stakeholder
platforms is to codify, frame, and standardize practices, in
particular by negotiating and issuing rules, norms, or
standards.
Contemporary CSR has clear American roots (e.g.,
Sheehy 2014). But CSR as we know it today has also
become embedded and inscribed through time in the pro-
gress of corporate capitalism and its transformation under
neoliberal globalization (Scherer et al. 2009; Segerlund
2010). The global trend towards explicit CSR identified by
Matten and Moon (2008) illustrates this co-evolution.
Along with the diffusion of explicit CSR as a set of prac-
tices has come the spread of a neoliberal understanding that
CSR was something unnaturally tied to business and could
be at most a voluntary engagement (Ho¨llerer 2013). As
Richter points out:
The CSR debate relies on a strict separation of the
public and private domain derived from the liberal
model. The liberal assumption of a minimalist state
guaranteeing the free exercise of private interests and
avoiding government coercion is translated into the
voluntary character of CSR in the CSR debate
(Richter 2010, p. 634).
Hence, contemporary globalization has neoliberal under-
pinnings and contemporary CSR practices remain anchored
within this paradigm. This neoliberal inscription has a
number of consequences for the ways in which business–
society interactions play out on the ground within contem-
porary CSR. This becomes all the more obvious when we
systematically compare and contrast neoliberal CSR with
our two historical ideal-types.
Differences and Similarities: Comparing
Contemporary CSR with Paternalism
and Trusteeship
The systematic comparison between contemporary CSR
and our two historical ideal-types allows us to identify four
principal dimensions along which the political role of firms
has varied over time and in parallel to shifting ideological
frames—territory, main actors, targets, and modes of
responsibility.
Territory: From Local to Global
The evolution, all the way from paternalism to contem-
porary corporate social responsibility, has come with a
broadening of the range of action and of target territories—
hence with a certain form of geographic universalization.
When we compare contemporary CSR to paternalism or
trusteeship, we realize that the temporal move also corre-
sponds to an extension of territory, as it were, of the
common good. Paternalism localized political responsibil-
ity; the firm was in charge of a narrow geographical
community. In the 1920–1930s, the trusteeship era
expanded the horizon of the political role of firms/corpo-
rations to the national territory. Contemporary CSR has the
world as its territory, at least potentially.
Political CSR scholars note that within this global ter-
ritory, multinational corporations (MNCs) fill institutional
and governmental voids particularly in developing coun-
tries. That business takes on political responsibilities vis-a`-
vis weak national governments is not in itself a new
development, as nineteenth century paternalism shows.
What differs, though, is the nature of the firms (MNCs) that
take on a political role in local communities and their
global reach and power.
More specific perhaps to our contemporary era is the
strong involvement of firms as political and rule-making
actors in the international/transnational context. When
talking of corporate political activities, one needs to
differentiate between the levels at which they occur. At the
local or national level, there might be no significant dif-
ference in nature or even in intensity with the political roles
exerted (well) before globalization. At the global level,
however, an entirely new space has been created for the
political activity and involvement of business.
New Actors: Towards a Virtualization of Actorhood
Under paternalism, the actors that became strongly
engaged in political and social activities were essentially
family or personal firms with strong anchoring in a regional
(and hence national) territory. During the trusteeship era,
the main actors were the new mostly nationally based joint
stock corporations of a re-invented American capitalism.
After 1929, those national corporations joined forces
through philanthropy networks—and those networks then
became important relays of the social and political
engagement of individual corporations.
As a consequence of its global diffusion, CSR has today
become structured as a broad and fluid transnational field,
with a multiplicity of nodes in relations of co-opetition
with each other (Levy and Kaplan 2008). The constellation
of actors is characterized by the fact that transnational
actors such as MNCs and multinational non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) play a major role compared to most
local actors or even to nation states. It is no surprise then,
that national governments across the world establish their
own transnational champions by controlling MNCs and
creating GONGOs, ‘‘governmental non-governmental
organizations’’ as a means to regain influence at the global
level (Cumming 2010).
Targets and Intentions: From Concrete to Elusive
Under paternalism, the targets of the social responsibility
and political activity of firms were real and intentions were
concrete—workers, their families and their welfare, and a
well-delineated local community and its prosperity. During
the trusteeship era, the targets were a dematerialized but
still identifiable national ‘‘citizen’’ and a physical national
territory. Intentions were structured around the defense of a
particular form of civilization (with a national base). In the
context of contemporary CSR, targets are the ‘‘global cit-
izen’’ or the ‘‘global environment’’ and intentions are
articulated around the elusive notion of the ‘‘global com-
mon good’’—a notion that is highly dematerialized and
quite difficult to grasp.
The new political turn of CSR acknowledges the great
power of MNCs at the global level—mirroring the local
power of the paternal firm and the national power of the
American corporation. What Clark called in 1926 the role
of ‘‘social accounting’’ (Clark 1926)—the potential of civil
society to influence and control public matters—has
translated today into the role of a dense ecology of medi-
ators (consultants, NGOs, the media, ranking and accredi-
tation bodies,…) that hold business accountable on a global
scale. In the process, the ultimate targets are being dis-
placed to quite an extent—from the subjects and objects
towards which the corporation engages its responsibility
(even in their elusive and disembodied form) towards, at
least in part, this dense ecology of mediators and
watchdogs.
New Modes: The De-Materialization of Responsibility
The expansion of territories and the ‘‘virtualization’’ of tar-
gets have come together with the progressive de-material-
ization of responsibility. Early paternalist owners could
clearly be identified as ‘‘real’’ individuals or families—and
they directly bore the responsibility for the social and
political engagement of their firms. The early American
corporation acting in the public interest was already a
somewhat more dematerialized actor. However, in the con-
text of weak and dispersed ownership, professional man-
agers came to embody corporate responsibility. Today,
pointing to the locus of responsibility(ies) in the context of
CSR is highly challenging if not outright impossible. Cor-
porations are understood to ‘‘belong to their shareholders’’
(Friedman 1970) and hence the responsibility should lie
there. What does it mean though to have an assembly of
dispersed and fluid shareholders as ultimate responsibility
bearers for CSR? If anything, it makes it difficult to apply a
‘‘liability model of responsibility’’ where ‘‘one assigns
responsibility to particular agents whose actions can be
shown as causally connected to the circumstances for which
responsibility is sought’’ (Young 2004, p. 368).
Furthermore, the more we move away from paternalism
and closer to contemporary CSR, the more we see the
strong role of discourse over actions in the management of
social and political responsibility. Naturally, the paternalist
owner or manager did build discursive strategies around his
actions (Coffey 2003) but those actions took center stage
and they could be concretely, physically identified and
experienced (e.g., the utopian familiste`re of Godin or
housing developments for workers around paternalist fac-
tories). A key issue with contemporary CSR is that of the
decoupling between increasingly dense discursive products
and actions that are becoming difficult to follow, experi-
ence, and monitor. This generates many outcries of
‘‘green’’ or ‘‘ethical’’ washing (Tokar 1997). The tools
mobilized to monitor social engagement and corporate
social responsibility are those of the ‘‘audit society’’
(Power 1997). Audits and measurements are used to pro-
duce multiple systems of ‘‘naming and shaming’’ (Boli
2006)—(positive and negative) rankings, accreditations,
and evaluations. This move towards a ‘‘measurability’’ of
responsibility is hailed as an important step leading to
transparency and efficiency. But the measurability and
‘‘quantification’’ of responsibility are also creating the
opportunity and the possibility for its commodification—
what is more, on a global scale. Arguably, this process of
commodification of responsibility could emerge as the
driver of collective irresponsibility (Mitchell 2002).
In Table 1, we bring together and summarize those three
different forms:
As we have shown above, the common good was in
private hands before it came to be, historically, ‘‘nation-
alized.’’ The rise of the welfare state in Europe and the
deployment of the American New Deal were reactions, in
part, to the strong discretionary power of private business
that had ruled until then. The project was to move towards
an at least partial nationalization of social responsibilities
with a view to marginalizing the power of private firms.
We agree with Matten et al. (2003, p. 116) and Beck (1995,
p. 98) that the ‘‘equation of politics and the state’’ is ‘‘a
modernist category error.’’ We hope to have provided
evidence that the privatization of the common good is not a
consequence of globalization. We can, however, come to
re-interpret the contemporary CSR movement as a case of
partial re-privatization of the common good, a partial
‘‘return to the past’’ but under different conditions.
The re-privatization of the common good that comes
together with contemporary CSR means that private eco-
nomic actors enjoy (again) a fair degree of discretionary
power. This principle of discretionary power is
stable across the background ideologies presented above.
The ideological frames of authoritarian benevolence,
managerial efficiency, and shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion all take for granted that private actors voluntarily have
the legitimacy to engage in political roles and responsi-
bilities. Those private actors, and in particular the large
corporations, have a relative free hand in the targeting of
certain constituencies over others, in the selection of cer-
tain issues and priorities over others, of certain tools over
others, as long as they remain within a general framework
that is so broad as to really constrain nothing (e.g., the
Global Compact). This is reminiscent, indeed, of the
greater degree of discretionary power traditionally associ-
ated with paternalism and managerial trusteeship, a dis-
cretionary power against which the (welfare) state and the
American New Deal had both attempted to fight.
Implications for Future Research: Overcoming
the Democracy Gap
Hence, we can and should learn from the historical short-
comings of paternalism and trusteeship and reflect upon
contemporary (political) CSR and its own limitations.
The discretionary, and as a consequence limited and
partial, nature of paternalism, and trusteeship generated
negative reactions. Those features indeed came, through
time, to be identified as problematic. Neither paternalism
nor trusteeship could be seen as fully legitimate in their
claims of serving ‘‘the common good,’’ nor even of han-
dling ‘‘the social question.’’ The ultimately private nature
of firms and the conflicts this generated, their limited and
highly discretionary reach and scope meant that political
engagement on their part could always be shown to be
wanting and to lack legitimacy. The development of the
welfare state in Europe and the deployment of the New
Deal in the United States were attempts, in part, to over-
come the limits of a system that strongly relied on private
actors by granting national governments a significant role.
Governments had, by nature, a ‘‘universal’’ national reach,
scope, and responsibility and were, at least formally,
legitimate over a given national territory.
These historical debates and criticisms appear to lend
empirical support to current critical readings of political
CSR and they specifically raise questions about the limits
and legitimacy of corporate discretionary political choices
(Banerjee 2007; Buchholz and Rosenthal 2004). In part as a
reaction to those issues, democratization mechanisms
aiming at stakeholder participation and empowerment are
increasingly identified as necessary conditions for the
legitimacy of corporate political involvement (Dallmayr
2003; Matten and Crane 2005b; Palazzo and Scherer 2008;
Renouard and Lado 2012). Scherer and Palazzo turn to
Habermas and propose deliberative democracy as a legit-
imizing process for corporate political involvement
(Palazzo and Scherer 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007).
Others develop the notion of ‘‘stakeholder democracy’’
(Crane et al. 2005; Harrison and Freeman 2004; Matten and
Crane 2005b; Thompson and Driver 2005). Stakeholder
democracy can be understood as ‘‘firm–stakeholder rela-
tions based on self-governing and voluntarism’’ (Matten
and Crane 2005b, p. 10) and implies that stakeholders
obtain a right to participate in decision-making processes,
to sit at the table (Crane et al. 2005, p. 72).
At one extreme, some scholars have argued against
stakeholder democracy as it undermines the legitimacy of
corporate and managerial authority (Van Oosterhout
2007). At the other extreme, the claim is that this does not
go far enough given the fundamental question of who is to
be included or excluded for the debate to be really
democratic (Parker 2002). The argument is that deliber-
ative democratic processes may in fact be de-politicizing
rather than re-politicizing. Even if there is agreement on
who should sit at the table, significant power differences
de facto imply the silencing of marginalized or dissonant
voices (Edward and Willmott 2012). This is reminiscent
of the evolution from controlling worker morality to
defending civil rights by paternalist firms. Because only
certain kinds of employee representation were allowed,
this development was still taming the political debate
rather than opening it.
Our critique of CSR is more radical, we propose, than
the one set out by political CSR scholars. Indeed, the
political CSR literature tends to champion corporate and
managerial voluntarism in the context of transnational
deliberative and participatory platforms as a possible path
towards a defense of the ‘‘common good.’’ But owner or
managerial discretion was precisely the main factor that
prevented, historically, both paternalism and trusteeship
from ‘‘serving the common good.’’ Hence, based on our
historical analysis, we argue that corporate and managerial
discretion and voluntarism at the transnational level are not
likely to be the solutions to social, environmental, and
political ills nor are they likely to be the best path to
‘‘serving the common (global) good.’’ On the basis of this
analysis, and in line with certain critics, we therefore call
for a more radical approach to stakeholder democracy in
global governance (Edward and Willmott 2008, 2012;
Whelan 2012). Whelan, for example, proposes that politi-
cal CSR needs to
Table 1 Political responsibility in historical perspective
Paternalism Trusteeship CSR
Ideological
frame
Authoritarian-owner
benevolence
Techno-managerial efficiency Shareholder value maximization
Territory Local National Global
Actors Family or personal firms National corporations and philanthropy networks Transnational, multi-actor constellations
(MNCs, NGOs…)
Targets Workers, families,
communities
Local communities, national citizens, and national
public interest
The global citizen, the global environment,
global common good
Modes Employers (direct) Managers (per delegation) Corporations and multi-actor platforms (diffuse
and partly indirect)
be associated with a ‘political’ model of corporate
governance that provides communities, citizenries,
and/or civil society, with similar voting rights to
those that shareholders enjoy within shareholder
corporate governance models (Whelan 2012, p. 719).
Based on our historical contextualization of CSR and its
redefinition as one form of business–society interactions
reflecting a unique ideological frame, we encourage future
research on the ‘‘democracy gap and (how to) make
corporate decisions more accountable’’ (Scherer and
Palazzo 2011, p. 921). As we argue here, in line with
Ma¨kinen and Kourula (2012), the political responsibilities
of business can take different forms—and those forms
reflect in part underlying ideologies. Contemporary CSR is
and remains deeply inscribed within a neoliberal frame.
And a multi-stakeholder re-interpretation of global political
CSR does little as yet to challenge this deep inscription. If
we are to overcome some of the problematic shortcomings
of contemporary (political) CSR, we will need to dis-
embed it from its associated neoliberal ideological frame—
and attempt to connect it with an alternative worldview.
One way in which to start doing this is to think about the
implications today, at the transnational level, of the solutions
devised historically to deal with the shortcomings of private
political engagement. The European welfare state and the
American New Deal both made two common claims—for-
mal legitimacy and universalism. The question for us today is
what could be the contemporary functional equivalent, at the
transnational level, of these kinds of solutions.
Conclusion
By exploring and comparing paternalism in nineteenth
century Europe, managerial trusteeship in early twentieth
century US, and contemporary CSR, we underscored
important differences as well as striking similarities. All
periods are characterized by business taking on strong
political roles and responsibilities, with high managerial
discretion. These roles and responsibilities nevertheless
differed in expanding the territory from local to global
reach. Actors evolved from family firms to transnational
multi-actor constellations, and went from targeting local
communities to global stakeholders. Finally, responsibility
was progressively dematerialized—from the original con-
crete and direct responsibility of the paternal employer to
diffuse and more indirect forms of corporate responsibility.
This historical contextualization shows that the frontier
between economy and polity has always been blurry and
shifting. Hence, we propose that Friedman’s ‘‘null
hypothesis’’ of a clear separation between business and
state responsibilities, far from describing a natural state of
things, reflects in reality a singular and limiting perspec-
tive—deeply anchored in neoliberal ideology. Furthermore,
we suggest that this powerful ideological frame and its
associated ‘‘null hypothesis’’ have been the source of and
have fueled the taken-for-grantedness of the principle of
voluntarism in the (political) CSR literature.
In light of our reading of the two historical ideal-types, we
may question whether a voluntary and deliberative demo-
cratic platform is sufficient to address the externalities and
welfare issues associated with globalized business and to
legitimize the strong political involvement of business.
While we are sympathetic to the idea of a possible democ-
ratization of corporate processes (Scherer and Palazzo
2007), we agree with Ma¨kinen and colleagues (2012, 2014)
or Whelan (2012) that Habermas’ political theory may not be
sufficient to bring along the democratization needed in the
context of contemporary challenges. If we started from an
alternative, historically informed, null hypothesis, that
business and state responsibilities are tightly interconnected,
often blurred, difficult to disentangle, and always being
negotiated, we could develop a more radical view of stake-
holder democracy for the proper governance of business
activities—one that goes well beyond the power and dis-
cretion of private corporate actors. This, we hope, opens new
perspectives and research avenues with a view to refine our
understanding of contemporary CSR and its political
dimension.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank two anonymous
reviewers and the Editors of the Special Issue for very useful com-
ments and suggestions throughout the revision process.
References
Acquier, A., Gond, J. P., & Pasquero, J. (2011). Rediscovering
Howard R. Bowen’s legacy: The unachieved agenda and
continuing relevance of social responsibilities of the business-
man. Business & Society, 50, 607–646.
Baden-Fuller, C., & Morgan, M. (2010). Business models as models.
Long Range Planning, 43(2–3), 156–171.
Banerjee, S. B. (2007). Corporate social responsibility. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Banerjee, S. B. (2011). Voices of the governed: Towards a theory of
the translocal. Organization, 18(3), 323–344.
Beck, H. (1995). Origins of the authoritarian welfare state in Prussia,
1815-1870. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Bentham, J. (1995). The panopticon writings. Ed. and intro.
M. Bozovic. London: Verso.
Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). Modern corporation and private
property. London and New York: Macmillan.
Boli, J. (2006). The rationalization of virtue and virtuosity in world
society. In M. L. Djelic & K. Sahlin-Andersson (Eds.),
Transnational governance (pp. 95–118). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Buchholz, R., & Rosenthal, S. (2004). Stakeholder theory and public
policy: How governments matter. Journal of Business Ethics,
51(1), 143–153.
Campbell, J., & Pedersen, O. (Eds.). (2001). The rise of neoliberalism
and institutional analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Carroll, A. (2008). A history of corporate social responsibility:
Concepts and practices. In A. Crane, D. Matten, A. McWilliams,
J. Moon, & D. Siegel (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate
social responsibility (pp. 19–46). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Chandler, A. (1977). The visible hand. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press.
Chandler, A. (1990). Scale and scope. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Cheal, D. J. (1979). Hegemony, ideology and contradictory con-
sciousness. The Sociological Quarterly, 20(1), 109–117.
Clark, J. M. (1926). Social control of business. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Coffey, J. (2003). Le´on Harmel. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press.
Colli, A., Perez, P., & Rose, M. (2003). National determinants of
family firm development. Enterprise and Society, 4(1), 28–64.
Collins, R. (1981). The business response to Keynes, 1929-1964. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Crane, A., Driver, C., Kaler, J., Parker, M., & Parkinson, J. (2005).
Stakeholder democracy: Towards a multi-disciplinary view.
Business Ethics: A European Review, 14(1), 67–75.
Crane, A., & Matten, D. (2008). Fear and loathing in the JCC:
Unleashing the monster of ‘New Corporate Citizenship Theory’
to confront category crisis. Journal of Corporate Citizenship,
29(March), 21–24.
Crane, A., Matten, M., & Moon, J. (2004). Stakeholders as citizens?
Rethinking rights, participation, and democracy. Journal of
Business Ethics, 53(1–2), 107–122.
Cumming, L. (2010). GONGOs. In H. K. Anheier & S. Toepler
(Eds.), International encyclopedia of civil society (pp. 779–783).
New York: Springer.
Dallmayr, F. (2003). Cosmopolitanism moral and political. Political
Theory, 31(3), 421–442.
Davies, W., & McGoey, L. (2012). Rationalities of ignorance: On
financial crises and the ambivalence of neo-liberal epistemology.
Economy and Society, 41(1), 64–83.
Debouzy, M. (1988). Permanence du paternalisme? Le Mouvement
Social, 3–16.
De Bry, F. (1980). Le paternalisme dans l’opinion des industriels
franc¸ais au XIXe`me sie`cle. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Universite´ de Paris-I.
De Geer, H., Borglund, T., & Frostenson, M. (2009). Reconciling
CSR with the role of the corporation in Welfare States: The
problematic Swedish example. Journal of Business Ethics, 89(3),
269–283.
Devinney, T. M. (2009). Is the socially responsible corporation a
myth? The good, the bad, and the ugly of corporate social
responsibility. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(2),
44–56.
Djelic, M. L. (1998). Exporting the American model. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Djelic, M. L. (2006). Marketization: From intellectual agenda to
global policy making. In M. L. Djelic & K. Sahlin-Andersson
(Eds.), Transnational governance (pp. 53–73). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Djelic, M. L., & Amdam, R. P. (2007). Americanization in
comparative perspective: The managerial revolution in France
and Norway, 1940-1990. Business History, 49(4), 483–505.
Dodd, E. (1932). For whom are corporate managers trustees? (pp.
1145–1163). XLV: Harvard Law Review.
Donham, W. B. (1927). The social significance of business. Harvard
Business Review, II, 401–419.
Doty, H., & Glick, W. (1994). Typologies as a unique form of theory
building: Toward improved understanding and modeling.
Academy of Management Review, 19(2), 230–251.
Eberstadt, N. (1973). What history tells us about corporate respon-
sibilities. Business and Society Review, 7, 76–81.
Editors, Fortune. (1949). The moral history of U.S. business. Fortune,
XL(6), 143–158.
Edward, P., & Willmott, H. (2008). Corporate citizenship: Rise or
demise of a myth? Academy of Management Review, 33(3),
771–773.
Edward, P., & Willmott, H. (2012). Discourse and normative business
ethics. In C. Lu¨tge (Ed.), Handbook of the philosophical
foundations of business ethics (pp. 549–580). Dordrecht:
Springer.
Elwood, S. (1932). Discussion of some sociological principles
underlying the community chest movement. Social Forces,
10(4), 494.
Engels, F. (1987 [1844]). The condition of the working class in
England. London: Penguin Books.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism.
Princeton University Press.
Fleming, P., & Jones, M. (2012). The end of corporate social
responsibility. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Fooks, G., Gilmore, A., Collin, J., Holden, C., & Lee, K. (2013). The
limits of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business
Ethics, 112(2), 283–299.
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits. New York Times Magazine, September 13.
Last retrieved January 2014 from http://www.colorado.edu/
studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.
html.
Garriga, E., & Mele´, D. (2004). Corporate social responsibility
theories: Mapping the territory. Journal of Business Ethics, 53(1/
2), 51–71.
Gillet, M. (1976). La gre`ve d’Anzin de 1884 et Germinal. Cahiers
Naturalistes, XXII(50), 59–66.
Glaser, B. (2002). Conceptualization: On theory and theorizing using
grounded theory. International Journal of Qualitative Methods,
1(2), 23–38.
Godin, J. B. (1881). Comment s’accomplit le progre`s social ? Le
Devoir, February 27, 129–130.
Gueslin, A., & Jones, M. (1993). Michelin, les hommes du pneu.
Paris: Ed. ouvrie`res.
Guiol, P. (2000). L’expe´rience Godin ou les ‘e´quivalents de la
richesse’. Panoramiques, 46(2), 94–104.
Hacking, I. (1990). Two kinds of ‘New Historicism’ for philosophers.
New Literary History, 21(3), 343–364.
Hall, J. (2007). Historicity and sociohistorical research. In W.
Outhwaite & S. Turner (Eds.), The Sage handbook of social
science methodology (pp. 82–99). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Harmel, L. (1889). Cate´chisme du patron. Paris: Aux bureaux du
journal la corporation.
Harrison, J. S., & Freeman, R. E. (2004). Special topic: Democracy in
and around organizations. Academy of Management Executive,
18(3), 49–53.
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hay, R., & Gray, E. (1974). Social responsibilities of business
managers. Academy of Management Journal, 17(1), 135–143.
Heald, M. 2005 [1970]. The social responsibilities of business. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Heath, J., Moriarty, J., & Norman, W. (2010). Business ethics and (or
as) political philosophy. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(3),
427–452.
Hernes, T. (2005). Four ideal-type organizational responses to New
Public Management reforms and some consequences. Interna-
tional Review of Administrative Sciences, 71(1), 5–17.
Hirschman, A. (1981). Essays in trespassing. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hobsbawm, E. (1996[1962]). The age of revolution: 1789-1848.
Vintage: First Vintage Books Edition.
Hoffman, R. (2007). Corporate social responsibility in the 1920s: An
institutional perspective. Journal of Management History, 13(1),
55–73.
Ho¨llerer, M. A. (2013). From taken-for-granted to explicit commit-
ment: The rise of CSR in a corporatist country. Journal of
Management Studies, 50(4), 573–606.
Horsfall, D. (2013). A fuzzy set ideal-type approach to measuring the
competition state. Policy and Society, 32(4), 345–356.
Hounshell, D. (1984). From the American system to mass production:
1800–1932. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ite, U. (2004). Multinationals and CSR in developing countries: A
case study of Nigeria. Corporate Social Responsibility and
Environmental Management, 11(1), 1–11.
Jones, M. T., & Haigh, M. (2007). The transnational corporation and
new corporate citizenship Theory. Journal of Corporate Citi-
zenship, 27, 51–69.
Joyce, P. (1980). Work, society and politics: The culture of the factory
in later Victorian England. Oxford: Taylor & Francis.
Kalb, D. (1997). Expanding class: Power and everyday politics in
industrial communities, The Netherlands 1850-1950. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Kaplan, R. (2015). Who has been regulating whom, business or
society? The mid-20th-century institutionalization of ‘‘corporate
responsibility’’ in the USA. Socio-Economic Review, 13(1),
125–155.
Katznelson, I. (2014). Fear itself: The New Deal and the origins of
our time. New York: Liveright.
Katznelson, I., & Zolberg, A. R. (Eds.). (1996). Working-class
formation. Nineteenth century patterns in Western Europe and
the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Khurana, R. (2010). From higher aims to hired hands. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Kieser, A. (1989). Organizational, institutional and societal evolution:
Medieval craft guilds and the genesis of formal organization.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(4), 540–564.
Kinderman, D. (2012). ‘Free us up so we can be responsible!’ The co-
evolution of CSR and neo-liberalism in the UK, 1977-2010.
Socio-Economic Review, 10(1), 29–57.
Kirstein, L. E. (1932). The challenge to businessmen. The Survey,
October 15, 501-503.
Lallement, M. (2009). Le travail de l’utopie. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Levi-Faur, D., & Jordana, J. (Eds.) (2005). The rise of regulatory
capitalism. In The annals of the American academy of political
and social science, Vol. 598. London: Sage.
Levy, D., & Kaplan, R. (2008). CSR and theories of global governance:
Strategic contestation in global issue arenas. In Crane, A.,
McWilliams, A., Matten, D., Moon, J., & Siegel, D. (Eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of CSR. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lyon, L. (1922). Education for business. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Mackey, A., Mackey, T., & Barney, J. (2007). Corporate social
responsibility and firm performance: Investor preferences and
corporate strategies. The Academy of Management Review,
32(3), 817–835.
Magnusson, L. (2000). An economic history of Sweden. London:
Routledge.
Ma¨kinen, J., & Kasanen, E. (2014). Boundaries between business and
politics: A study on the division of moral labor. Journal of
Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2419-x.
Ma¨kinen, J., & Kourula, A. (2012). Pluralism in political corporate
social responsibility. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(4), 649–678.
Ma¨kinen, J., & Kourula, A. (2013). Globalization, national politics
and corporate social responsibility. In R. Tainio, S. Merilainen,
J. Ma¨kinen, & M. Laihonen (Eds.), Limits of globalization (pp.
219–235). Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.
Marchand, R. (1985). Advertising the American dream. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Marens, R. (2008). Recovering the past: Reviving the legacy of the
early scholars of corporate social responsibility. Journal of
Management History, 14(1), 55–72.
Marens, R. (2012). Generous in victory? American managerial
autonomy, labour relations and the invention of corporate social
responsibility. Socio-Economic Review, 10(1), 59–84.
Marens, R. (2013). What comes around: The early 20th century
American roots of legitimating corporate social responsibility.
Organization, 20(3), 454–476.
Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. (2003). Misery loves companies:
Rethinking social initiatives by business. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 48, 268–305.
Mark-Ungericht, B., & Weiskopf, R. (2007). Filling the empty shell.
Journal of Business Ethics, 70(3), 285–297.
Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005a). Corporate citizenship: Toward an
extended theoretical conceptualization. Academy of Management
Review, 30(1), 166–179.
Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005b). What is stakeholder democracy?
Perspectives and issues. Business Ethics, 14(1), 6–13.
Matten, D., Crane, A., & Chapple, W. (2003). Behind the mask:
Revealing the true face of corporate citizenship. Journal of
Business Ethics, 45(1–2), 109–120.
Matten, D., & Moon, J. (2008). Implicit’’ and ‘‘explicit’’ CSR.
Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 404–424.
Mauss, M. (1967[1925]). The Gift. Norton, MA: Norton Library.
McCraw, T. (Ed.). (1997). Creating modern capitalism. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
McKenna, C. D. (2006). The world’s newest profession: Management
consulting in the twentieth century. Cambridge University Press.
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility:
A theory of the firm perspective. Academy of Management
Review, 26(1), 117–127.
Mena, S., & Palazzo, G. (2012). Input and output legitimacy of multi-
stakeholder initiatives. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(3),
527–556.
Mirowski, P., & Plehwe, D. (Eds.). (2009). The road from Mont
Pe`lerin. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Mitchell, L. (2002). Corporate irresponsibility. New Haven, NJ: Yale
University Press.
Navin, T., & Sears, M. (1953). The Rise of a market for industrial
securities, 1887-1902. Business History Review, 29(2), 105–123.
Nielsen, N. J. (1994). Lifelong care and control paternalism in
nineteenth-century factory communities. Ethnologia Scandinav-
ica, 24, 70–89.
Noiriel, G. (1988). Du ‘‘patronage’’ au ‘‘paternalisme’’. Le Mouve-
ment Social, 144, 17–35.
Nussbaum, F. (2002[1933]). An early history of the economic
institutions of Europe. Washington, DC: Beard Books.
Padelford, W., & White, D. W. (2009). The shaping of a society’s
economic ethos: A longitudinal study of individuals’ morality of
profit-making worldview. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(1),
67–75.
Palazzo, G., & Scherer, A. G. (2006). Corporate legitimacy as
deliberation: A communicative framework. Journal of Business
Ethics, 66(1), 71–88.
Palazzo, G., & Scherer, A. (2008). Corporate social responsibility,
democracy, and the politicization of the corporation. Academy of
Management Review, 33(3), 773–775.
Parker, C. (2002). The open corporation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.
Pollard, S. (1965). The genesis of modern management. London:
Penguin.
Power, M. (1997). The audit society. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Prakash, A., & Griffin, J. (2012). Corporate responsibility, multina-
tional corporations, and nation states: An introduction. Business
and Politics, 14(3), 1–10.
Quadagno, J. (1987). Theories of the welfare state. Annual Review of
Sociology, 1, 109–128.
Quinn, M. (1997). The fallacy of non-interference: The poor
panopticon and equality of opportunity. Journal of Bentham
Studies, 1, 1–18.
Reid, D. (1985). Industrial paternalism. Comparative Studies in
Society and History, 27(4), 579–607.
Renouard, C., & Lado, H. (2012). RSE et justice sociale: Le cas des
multinationales pe´trolie`res dans le Delta du Niger. Afrique et
De´veloppement, 37(2), 167–194.
Richter, U. (2010). Liberal thought in reasoning on CSR. Journal of
Business Ethics, 97(4), 625–649.
Roberts, D. (1958). Tory paternalism and social reform in early
Victorian England. The American Historical Review, 63(2),
323–337.
Roosevelt, F.D. (1936). A rendezvous with destiny. Speech before the
1936 National Democratic Convention, Philadelphia, June 27.
Retrieved 20 October 2014 from http://www.austincc.edu/
lpatrick/his2341/fdr36acceptancespeech.htm.
Rotter, J. P., Airike, P.-E., & Mark-Herbert, C. (2014). Exploring
political corporate social responsibility in global supply chains.
Journal of Business Ethics, 125(4), 581–599.
Roy, W. (1997). Socializing capital. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Sabel, C., & Zeitlin, J. (1985). Historical alternatives to mass
production: Politics, markets, and technology in nineteenth-
century industrialization. Past and Present, 108, 133–176.
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2007). Toward a political conception
of corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management
Review, 32(4), 1096–1120.
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2011). The new political role of
business in a globalized world. Journal of Management Studies,
48(4), 899–931.
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Matten, D. (2009). Introduction to the
special issue: Globalization as a challenge for business respon-
sibilities. Business Ethics Quarterly, 19(3), 327–347.
Schlesinger, A. (1958). The coming of the New Deal—The age of
Roosevelt (Vol. 2). Boston: Hougthon Mifflin.
Schmid, H. (1981). On the origin of ideology. Acta Sociologica,
24(1–2), 57–73.
Screpanti, E., & Zamagni, S. (2005). An outline of the history of
economic thought (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Segerlund, L. (2010). Making CSR a global concern. Farnham:
Ashgate Publishing.
Sheehy, B. (2014). Defining CSR: Problems and solutions. Journal of
Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2281-x.
Simmons, B., & Elkins, Z. (2004). The globalization of liberalization.
American Political Science Review, 98(1), 171–189.
Sklar, M. (1980). Corporate reconstruction of American capitalism,
1890–1916. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Skocpol, T. (Ed.). (1984). Vision and method in historical sociology.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Soliva, R. (2007). Landscape Stories: Using ideal type narratives as a
heuristic device in rural studies. Journal of Rural Studies, 23(1),
62–74.
Somers, M. (1995a). What’s political or cultural about political
culture and the public sphere? Towards an historical sociology of
concept formation. Sociological Theory, 13(2), 113–144.
Somers, M. (1995b). Narrating and naturalizing civil society and
citizenship theory: The place of political culture and the public
sphere. Sociological Theory, 13(3), 229–274.
Spector, B. (2008). Business responsibilities in a divided world.
Enterprise & Society, 9(2), 314–336.
Sutton, F., Harris, S., Kaysen, C., & Tobin, J. (1956). The American
business creed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thompson, G., & Driver, C. (2005). Stakeholder champions: How to
internationalize the corporate social responsibility agenda.
Business Ethics, 14(1), 56–66.
Tokar, B. (1997). Earth for sale. Boston: South End Press.
Tone, A. (1997). The business of benevolence: Industrial paternalism
in corporate America. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1998). Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach.
London: Sage.
Van Du¨lmen, R. (1989). Industriekultur an der Saar: Leben und
Arbeit in einer Industrieregion 1840-1914. Munich: Beck.
Van Oosterhout, H. (2005). Corporate citizenship: An idea whose
time has not yet come. The Academy of Management Review,
30(4), 677–681.
Van Oosterhout, H. (2007). Authority and democracy in corporate
governance? Journal of Business Ethics, 71(4), 359–370.
Vogel, D. J. (2005). Is there a market for virtue? The business case for
corporate social responsibility. California Management Review,
47(4).
Watkins, J. (1952). Ideal types and historical explanation. The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 3(9), 22–43.
Weber, M. (1949[1904]). ‘Objectivity’ in social science and social
policy. In Shils, E. & Finch, H. (Eds.), Max Weber: The
methodology of the social sciences. Glencoe: The Free Press.
Weber, M. (1978[1922]). Economy and society. Berkeley: University
of California.
Whelan, G. (2012). The political perspective of corporate social
responsibility: A critical research agenda. Business Ethics
Quarterly, 22(4), 709–737.
Willke, H., & Willke, G. (2008). Corporate moral legitimacy and the
legitimacy of morals: A critique of Palazzo/Scherer’s commu-
nicative framework. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(1), 27–38.
Yin, R. (2014). Case-study research: Design and methods. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Yogev, E. (2001). Corporate hand in academic glove—The case of
the Harvard group in the 1920’s. American Studies International,
39(1), 52–71.
Young, O. (1929). Address of Owen D. Young, January 1929. In J.
Sears (Ed.), The new place of the stockholder (p. 209). New
York: Harper & Brothers.
Young, I. M. (2004). Responsibility and global labor justice. The
Journal of Political Philosophy, 12(4), 365–388.
Zunz, O. (2011). Philanthropy in America: A history. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
